Safeguarding institutional independence in Edo state

By Eghosa Erhumwunse

The Proposed Repeal of Legislative and Judicial Financial Autonomy Laws

The decision of the Edo State House of Assembly to commence consideration of bills seeking to repeal the Edo State House of Assembly Funds Management Law, 2023 and the Edo State Judiciary Financial Autonomy Law, 2023 deserves the attention of every Edo citizen.

This matter should not be reduced to partisan politics or disagreements between present and former political office holders. It concerns the independence of two important institutions of government and, more fundamentally, the quality of democratic governance in Edo State.

The central question is not simply whether the House of Assembly has the legislative authority to repeal laws previously enacted by it. It ordinarily does. The more important questions are why these laws are being repealed, what arrangements will replace them, and whether the resulting framework will preserve the financial independence guaranteed to State Legislatures and Judiciaries by the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria.

What Is Before the House?

The Order Paper of the Edo State House of Assembly for Wednesday, 19 August 2026, lists for First Reading a Bill to repeal the Edo State Judiciary Financial Autonomy Law, 2023, and another to repeal the Edo State House of Assembly Funds Management Law, 2023.

Both bills are sponsored by Hon. Ojiezele, Osezua Sunday, representing Esan South-East.

At this stage, the laws have not been repealed. First Reading represents the beginning of the legislative process. There is therefore an opportunity for the House to explain the purpose of the proposed repeals and for citizens and relevant stakeholders to examine their implications.

That opportunity should be used.

Why Financial Autonomy Matters to Edo Citizens

Financial autonomy can easily be misunderstood as an issue concerning only legislators, judges and political office holders. It is much broader than that.

An independent Legislature is necessary for effective oversight of government expenditure, scrutiny of budgets, investigation of public institutions and representation of citizens.

An independent Judiciary is equally essential. Courts must be able to determine disputes involving citizens, businesses and government without institutional dependence on any party whose actions may come before them for adjudication.

The citizen questioning how public funds were spent needs an effective Legislature. A community seeking answers about an abandoned government project needs representatives capable of conducting oversight. A person challenging an administrative decision requires a Judiciary capable of acting independently.

Financial autonomy is therefore not principally about protecting politicians or judicial officers. It is about creating conditions under which public institutions can perform their constitutional responsibilities without improper financial pressure.

The Constitutional Position

The debate also requires an important legal distinction.

The Supreme Court’s decision in 2022 invalidating Executive Order 10 of 2020 did not abolish the constitutional principle of financial independence for State Legislatures and Judiciaries. The controversy surrounding Executive Order 10 concerned, among other matters, the constitutional authority of the Federal Executive to impose the particular enforcement mechanism contained in that Order.

The constitutional position subsequently became clearer.

The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (Fifth Alteration) (No. 6) Act, 2023 strengthened the framework for the financial independence of State Houses of Assembly and State Judiciaries.

Section 121 of the Constitution now provides a more detailed framework governing funds standing to the credit of these institutions, including mechanisms for payment and disbursement of appropriated funds.

This has an important consequence for the present debate.

The Edo State House of Assembly may repeal a State law, but a State law cannot repeal or override the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria.

The question is therefore not whether repeal of the two 2023 Edo laws automatically extinguishes financial autonomy. It cannot extinguish a constitutional requirement. The real question is what legal and administrative framework will operate after the repeal and whether that framework will comply fully with Section 121 of the Constitution.

Repeal Is Not Necessarily a Reversal of Autonomy

It would be premature to conclude, solely from the Order Paper, that the purpose of the bills is to return the Legislature and Judiciary to Executive financial control.

There may be legitimate reasons for reviewing the existing laws.

Some provisions may have become unnecessary following changes to the Constitution. There may be duplication between State legislation and the constitutional framework. Experience in implementing the laws may also have revealed problems relating to accounting, procurement, auditing or financial administration.

If these are the reasons for the proposed repeal, they should be clearly stated.

There is also an important accountability dimension. Financial autonomy cannot mean freedom from financial scrutiny.

The Legislature and Judiciary remain public institutions managing public resources. Their expenditure should be subject to lawful appropriation, proper accounting, procurement standards, audit and other appropriate accountability mechanisms.

The objective should therefore be financial independence with financial accountability.

The Risk of Executive Financial Dependence

The situation becomes more concerning if repeal would have the practical effect of returning control over appropriated funds of the Legislature or Judiciary to the discretion of the Executive.

The principle of separation of powers depends upon each arm of government having sufficient institutional independence to perform its constitutional responsibilities.

A Legislature that depends on discretionary Executive releases for its operations may find its oversight functions compromised. Investigations, public hearings, committee activities and other legislative functions require institutional resources.

This does not mean that every financially dependent Legislature will necessarily surrender its independence. It means that such dependence creates an avoidable structural vulnerability.

The same concern applies with particular force to the Judiciary.

The Judiciary may be required to determine cases involving the Governor, State ministries, agencies and other public authorities. Its institutional independence should therefore not depend excessively on discretionary financial decisions by the same Executive whose actions may come before the courts.

The purpose of good constitutional arrangements is not merely to prevent actual interference. It is also to reduce the opportunity for such interference and preserve public confidence in institutions.

This Should Not Be About Political Personalities

Former Speaker of the Edo State House of Assembly, Rt. Hon. Marcus Onobun, has raised concerns that repealing the financial autonomy framework could weaken separation of powers and effective legislative oversight.

Those concerns deserve consideration.

However, the discussion should go beyond the position of any individual, political party or administration.

Governors change. Speakers change. Legislative majorities change. Political parties move in and out of government.

Institutions remain.

The standard by which this proposal should be judged is therefore not whether citizens trust the present Governor, present Speaker or present House of Assembly.

A more useful test is whether the proposed arrangement would still be considered acceptable if political power were tomorrow exercised by people with whom we strongly disagreed.

Institutional safeguards are most valuable precisely because they do not depend on the goodwill of individual office holders.

Questions That Require Answers

Before the repeal bills proceed to final passage, the Edo State House of Assembly should provide sufficient information for citizens to understand their purpose and consequences.

Why is outright repeal necessary? Which provisions of the existing laws have become obsolete, problematic or inconsistent with the present constitutional framework?

Why is repeal preferable to amendment? If specific provisions require correction, could targeted amendments address those concerns?

Most importantly, what will replace the existing laws?

If replacement legislation or another financial management framework is contemplated, it would be helpful for the public to see it alongside the repeal proposals.

The House should also clarify whether appropriated funds will continue to reach the House of Assembly and Judiciary directly and predictably in accordance with the Constitution.

It should be made clear whether the proposed arrangement will increase Executive discretion over the timing, amount or release of funds already appropriated to these institutions.

There should equally be clarity regarding audit, procurement, accounting and other safeguards for ensuring that financial autonomy does not undermine accountability for public resources.

The Case for Public Participation

The significance of these proposals provides a strong case for public engagement before final passage.

The full text of the repeal bills, their explanatory memoranda and any proposed replacement framework should be made publicly accessible.

The House should also consider providing an opportunity for relevant stakeholders to make representations. These could include the Judiciary, the Nigerian Bar Association, constitutional and public finance experts, civil society organisations, professional bodies, academics and interested Edo citizens.

Public participation should not be viewed as an obstacle to legislation. It can strengthen legislation.

If the proposed repeal is intended simply to harmonise Edo law with the Constitution, remove duplication or improve financial accountability, transparent scrutiny should help establish that fact.

If there are unintended weaknesses in the proposals, consultation gives the House an opportunity to identify and address them before the bills become law.

Strong Institutions Should Be Our Common Interest

Edo State requires an Executive strong enough to govern effectively, a Legislature independent enough to scrutinise government effectively, and a Judiciary sufficiently independent to administer justice without fear or favour.

None should exist at the expense of the others.

A strong Governor does not require a weak House of Assembly. An effective Executive does not require a financially vulnerable Judiciary. Equally, an independent Legislature or Judiciary should not be beyond financial scrutiny and public accountability.

The appropriate balance is one in which institutional independence and accountability reinforce each other.

This is why the debate should not be framed merely as being for or against the present administration. It is a question about the kind of governance institutions Edo State wants to preserve for the future.

If the existing 2023 laws have defects, those defects should be identified and corrected.

If provisions have become redundant because of subsequent constitutional changes, that should be explained.

If a stronger framework is proposed, Edo citizens should be allowed to examine it.

But if the effect of repeal would be to return constitutionally protected institutions to discretionary Executive financial control, then the implications deserve serious public consideration.

Conclusion

The issue before Edo State is bigger than whether two laws should remain on the statute books.

The questions are straightforward:

What exactly is being repealed? Why is repeal necessary? What will replace the existing framework? Will the new arrangement strengthen or weaken the financial and institutional independence of the Legislature and Judiciary?

Those questions deserve clear answers.

Financial autonomy should not be treated as a privilege belonging to legislators or judicial officers. It forms part of the institutional framework through which separation of powers, checks and balances and accountable government are protected.

At the same time, autonomy must go together with transparency, audit discipline and responsible management of public resources.

Edo State therefore does not have to choose between independence and accountability. It needs both.

This is ultimately a matter for all Edo people because the institutional arrangements established today will outlive the individuals and political parties presently holding office.

The enduring question is not who exercises power in Edo State today, but whether the institutions we preserve will be strong enough to protect the public interest tomorrow.
Eghosa Erhumwunse