Two Generals down, one question up: Is Nigeria’s Northeast becoming a lost cause?

Jihadist insurgents have killed Brigadier General Oseni Omoh Braimah, the Commanding Officer of the 29 Task Force Brigade, in a coordinated overnight attack on a military base in Benisheikh, Borno State, the second Nigerian general to be killed by insurgents in less than five months, and the highest-ranking military official to die in the long-running conflict since 2021.

The Defence Headquarters confirmed the attack, with Director of Defence Media Operations, Major General Michael Onoja, stating that the assault occurred at approximately 12:30 a.m. on April 9, 2026, when insurgents attempted to breach the defensive perimeter of the military installation.

Intelligence sources told AFP that the insurgents overran the brigade, torched vehicles and buildings before withdrawing. One intelligence source put the death toll at least 18.

According to Onoja, the troops responded to the attack with “exceptional courage, professionalism, and superior firepower.” The attackers were forced to retreat “in disarray, abandoning their mission and leaving behind traces of their failed assault.”

Reports from local sources indicate that civilians, a member of the Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF), security operatives, and several insurgents were also killed during coordinated attacks carried out in Benisheikh town and Pulka community in Gwoza Local Government Area.

President Bola Tinubu expressed deep sadness over the killing, describing the fallen soldiers as “unforgettable and irreplaceable” heroes. “I extend my condolences to the families of our gallant soldiers, led by Brigadier-General Oseni Omoh Braimah, who made the ultimate sacrifice in the defence of our country today in Borno State. The government will never forget their sacrifices. Their sacrifices will not be in vain,” the President said.

Tinubu framed the attack as a sign of desperation by a weakened insurgency, stating: “From the reports I have received, our armed forces have been conducting sustained, intense land and air offensives against the insurgents, neutralising many of their fighters and commanders. The insurgents’ counterattack is a sign of desperation.” He urged the military not to be discouraged, calling on Nigerians and the media to stand with the armed forces.

Brigadier General Braimah was the second top officer to be killed in five months as violence surges across Nigeria’s mostly Muslim north. His death follows the killing of Brigadier General Musa Uba in mid-November 2025 by the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP). Uba, who commanded the 25 Task Force Brigade in Damboa, Borno State, was ambushed during a patrol, captured and subsequently killed. He was the highest-ranking military official to die in the conflict since the death of Brigadier General Zirkushu Dzarma in November 2021.

Analysts have said the killing of Uba underscored poor coordination between Nigeria’s military authority and counter-terrorism units, as well as inadequate technological improvements despite increased defence spending, while also pointing to ISWAP’s increased capability in rapid intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance.

The Benisheikh attack is part of a pattern of escalating insurgent activity that has sharply undermined government claims of progress in the war against terrorism. In the six weeks preceding this attack, similar raids had targeted military outposts, IDP camps, and remote villages in Borno, Yobe, and parts of Adamawa, resulting in dozens of deaths and abductions, despite ongoing counter-insurgency efforts under Operation Hadin Kai.

Just days before the Benisheikh assault, a Boko Haram faction released a video showing 416 civilians abducted from Ngoshe in Gwoza Local Government Area, still in captivity more than a month after their abduction in early March, a kidnapping that also began with the overrunning of a military base.

The United States earlier this year sent 200 troops to Nigeria to provide technical and training support to soldiers fighting jihadist groups, while in December, the U.S., with Nigerian assistance, bombed northwest Sokoto State targeting Islamic State Sahel Province fighters. Despite this international support, the latest attacks suggest that insurgents retain both the capability and the will to strike at the heart of Nigeria’s military infrastructure.

As the nation reeled from the Benisheikh massacre and simultaneous bandit attacks across multiple northern states, a jarring image crystallised the disconnect at the top of Nigeria’s security establishment: the Minister of Defence was inspecting a party convention venue.

In the early hours of a Friday at the APC Convention Centre within Eagle Square in Abuja, the Minister of Defence, retired General Christopher Musa, joined senior party figures to assess preparedness and coordination arrangements for the ruling party’s national convention. The visit was framed as a security inspection, but it was security for a political gathering, not for the soldiers and civilians dying on multiple frontlines.

Musa, who chairs the APC National Convention Security Committee, had earlier inaugurated the committee, vowing to develop a comprehensive and proactive security strategy to protect “thousands of delegates, party leaders, government officials, and observers” expected at the convention.

The optics were difficult to ignore. On March 29, gunmen invaded Anguwan Rukuba in Jos North Local Government Area of Plateau State, leaving at least 28 people dead and several others injured, an attack so severe it prompted the Plateau State Government to impose a 48-hour curfew. The following week, suspected bandits struck again, killing at least two people, injuring scores, and burning down houses and food barns in Pwomol village in Barkin Ladi Local Government Area of Plateau State, the second attack on the same community within a single week.

In Benue State, bandits attacked Abande community in Kwande Local Government Area, killing a Police Superintendent and four residents, one of several deadly raids that have made the state a near-permanent theatre of civilian carnage.

Security analysts and civil society groups have described the persistent attacks across Plateau, Kaduna, and Benue states as part of a broader and worsening pattern of insecurity, with the Coalition of Northern Groups warning that the region has become “a war theatre” requiring urgent national attention.

Opposition presidential candidate Peter Obi, in a statement released on April 6, recalled that President Tinubu had personally visited Jos on April 2 and assured residents that recent deadly attacks “will not repeat”, only for another attack to occur in Nyamgo Gyel, Jos South, within days. Obi described the continued killings as “a failure of leadership and responsibility,” noting that the perpetrators “are not invisible” and that government inaction has emboldened them.

That the man constitutionally responsible for overseeing the nation’s military apparatus chose, in the same period to chair a political party security committee and inspect a convention venue in Abuja has drawn quiet but pointed criticism from security watchers, who note that it reflects a broader pattern of civilian and military elites treating the nation’s security crisis as a background condition rather than an emergency demanding undivided focus.

Beyond the battlefield, the Nigerian military faces a deepening crisis of confidence rooted in questions about who is fighting in its ranks. The government’s Deradicalisation, Rehabilitation, and Reintegration (DRR) programme, most prominently executed through Operation Safe Corridor  has drawn sustained criticism from security analysts, victims’ groups, and frontline communities since its establishment in 2016.

In March and April 2025, 600 and 390 “repentant Boko Haram members” respectively completed the programme, receiving vocational training, cash payments, and startup equipment upon graduation. Critics argue the scale and speed of such graduations outpace any credible vetting process. Victims and affected communities have accused the government of prioritising perpetrators over survivors, and doubts persist about the sincerity of former insurgents, including fears that some may be acting as informants for active cells or could revert to militancy if they again become disgruntled or ostracised.

Security analysts have described the policy of recruiting repentant terrorists into the army as a self-inflicting strategy that infiltrates the troops and other security agencies, potentially loosening the grip on apprehended terrorism suspects.

The Defence Headquarters has pushed back against such characterisations. As recently as March 31, 2026, the Coordinator of Operation Safe Corridor, Brigadier General Yusuf Alli, stated emphatically that the military is “not recruiting any killers into the army,” insisting that anyone with a criminal record is automatically disqualified from enlistment and that the programme is strictly a rehabilitation and reintegration initiative, not a military recruitment pipeline. However, independent security researchers note that no long-term evaluations of the programme’s effectiveness have been published, making it impossible to independently verify the military’s assurances.

Weapons Shortfalls and Allegations of Senior Officers Pocketing Funds

Compounding the concerns over personnel integrity is a long-documented crisis of equipment and procurement corruption, one that soldiers themselves have repeatedly raised through unofficial channels.

Research drawing on interviews with personnel at the Defence Headquarters, Ministry of Defence, and the Budget Office found evidence that some military officers, politicians, and public officials had enriched themselves by diverting funds meant to fight terrorism. Expenditures were sometimes duplicated using different budget headings, and the lack of transparency in military procurement encouraged the purchase of outdated weapons instead of modern equipment, leaving armed forces without the tools needed to fight terrorists and bandits.

Reports of commanding officers diverting to their private accounts funds intended for barracks renovation and soldiers’ allowances have been widespread. Junior military personnel are said to widely believe their chiefs and commanders are more focused on defending their own financial interests than defending the nation.

Transparency International has specifically cited reports of ghost soldiers, the skimming of soldiers’ salaries, and the procurement of faulty and outdated weaponry as misconduct within the armed forces that directly affected operational effectiveness against insurgents in the Northeast.

In May 2025, 18 soldiers and 15 police officers were arrested for selling military weapons to armed groups, a revelation that demonstrated corruption is not confined to senior leadership but is embedded at multiple levels of the security apparatus.

Nigeria’s Defence Industries Corporation (DICON), established to build domestic military self-reliance, has been hamstrung by underfunding and bureaucracy. Local manufacturers like Proforce already produce mine-resistant vehicles, yet the military continues to import overpriced, refurbished equipment through questionable middlemen — a pattern that analysts say reflects a broken procurement system rather than a shortage of domestic capacity.

Nigeria’s defence and security budget has grown significantly reaching an estimated ₦5.41 trillion in 2026, yet analysts warn that increasing budget figures does not automatically translate into improved security outcomes without effective strategy, accountability, and systemic reform in intelligence, logistics, and coordination. The paradox of rising defence expenditure alongside rising insurgent casualties is, for many critics, the most damning indictment of how the money is being spent or misspent.

The deaths of two brigadier generals within five months each commanding major task force brigades in the Northeast raise sharp and urgent questions about troop protection, intelligence failures, the integrity of the deradicalisation pipeline, and the overall direction of Nigeria’s two-decade-long war against Boko Haram and ISWAP. That the man charged with answering those questions was, in the same breath, ensuring the safety of party delegates at Eagle Square speaks volumes about where Nigeria’s security priorities currently reside.