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State Police: Why constitutional approval may not guarantee safer communities without strong safeguards

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‘I joined kidnap gang to raise money for marriage’ — suspect tells Police

With 28 state assemblies approving the proposed constitutional amendment, Nigeria is moving closer to decentralised policing. But concerns over political interference, inadequate funding, recruitment standards and human rights protections raise questions about whether state governments are prepared to exercise policing powers responsibly.

Nigeria’s proposed transition to state policing has reached a significant legislative milestone, but the prospect of allowing governors to control police formations within their jurisdictions has renewed concerns about political interference, institutional independence and the protection of citizens’ rights.

Although supporters describe decentralised policing as a necessary response to worsening insecurity, the success of the proposed reform may depend less on constitutional approval than on whether states can establish accountable, adequately funded and professionally managed police institutions.

On November 3, 2026, the National Assembly announced that 28 State Houses of Assembly had approved the proposed constitutional amendment establishing State Police Services, exceeding the constitutional requirement of 24 states.

The approval represents an important step towards changing Nigeria’s centralised policing structure, under which the Nigeria Police Force operates primarily under federal authority.

The proposed amendment, contained in the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (Sixth Alteration) Bill, 2026, seeks to establish a dual policing arrangement comprising Federal Police Services and State Police Services.

However, the amendment had not received presidential assent as of November 18, meaning the proposed constitutional framework had not yet become law.

Even after the amendment is completed, individual states will need appropriate legislation and operational arrangements before their police services can commence operations.

The development has therefore shifted attention towards a more fundamental question: will decentralising policing make Nigerians safer, or could it create another layer of security institutions vulnerable to political control and human rights abuses?

Advocates of state police argue that Nigeria’s security challenges require a policing structure capable of responding more quickly to local threats.

The country faces multiple security problems, including kidnapping, banditry, terrorism, communal violence, armed robbery and attacks on rural communities.

Under the existing arrangement, state governors are regarded as chief security officers of their respective states but have limited operational control over police deployments.

Supporters of state policing argue that allowing states to establish their own forces would improve intelligence gathering, emergency response and cooperation with local communities.

In a report published in June 2026, Reuters noted that supporters of the reform believed decentralised policing could improve officers’ understanding of local security conditions and strengthen responses to criminal activities.

However, the same proposal has generated concerns about the concentration of policing powers in the hands of governors, particularly in states where political competition is intense and institutional oversight is weak.

A police force controlled by a governor could potentially be used to intimidate opposition politicians, suppress peaceful demonstrations, harass journalists or target individuals perceived as political opponents.

These concerns make institutional independence and effective accountability central to the success of the proposed reform.

The proposed constitutional amendment includes provisions intended to limit political interference and prevent state police from becoming personal security organisations for governors.

Under the proposed framework, state governors would appoint commissioners of police, subject to recommendations by the appropriate police authorities and confirmation by the State House of Assembly.

The proposal also provides for State Police Service Commissions responsible for recruitment, discipline and personnel management.

Another important safeguard is the proposed independence of police oversight institutions from executive control.

The legislation also provides for a stronger National Police Council to coordinate policing standards and relationships between federal and state police organisations.

However, the effectiveness of these safeguards will depend on how independently the institutions operate in practice.

In states where governors’ political parties dominate the legislature, legislative confirmation of senior police appointments may not necessarily prevent partisan influence.

Similarly, an oversight commission may struggle to investigate abuses involving powerful government officials if its members lack financial independence, security of tenure or protection from political pressure.

An October 27, 2026 investigation by The Guardian highlighted concerns raised by human rights advocates and legal experts over whether the proposed institutional safeguards would be sufficiently independent to prevent governors from abusing state police.

The report also questioned whether the existence of oversight commissions would be enough to guarantee accountability in states where political interests dominate public institutions.

Financing represents another major challenge facing the proposed reform.

Establishing a functional police service requires more than recruiting officers and providing uniforms.

States will need to fund salaries, pensions, training institutions, operational vehicles, communication equipment, forensic facilities, surveillance technology, weapons management, detention facilities and independent complaints mechanisms.

These responsibilities could place significant pressure on state budgets, particularly in states with relatively weak internally generated revenue.

The proposed constitutional framework includes provisions for direct funding of State Police Services, while also allowing financial assistance from the Federal Government under specified conditions.

However, guaranteed access to funds does not automatically translate into financial sustainability.

States will need transparent budgeting arrangements and independent auditing to ensure that allocations intended for policing are not diverted or used to reward political loyalists.

There is also the question of whether poorer states will be able to maintain professional police formations comparable to those in wealthier states.

Without a national funding framework that addresses differences in states’ financial capacities, decentralised policing could produce significant inequalities in security provision.

Some states may have the resources to acquire modern surveillance systems and maintain adequately trained personnel, while others could struggle to pay salaries and provide basic operational equipment.

The recruitment process will also determine whether state police services become professional security institutions or extensions of existing political structures.

Allowing state governments to recruit personnel without strict national standards could create opportunities for favouritism, ethnic discrimination and political patronage.

There are also concerns about the possible recruitment of individuals with questionable backgrounds or the conversion of informal vigilante groups into police formations without adequate vetting and professional training.

To address these risks, the proposed reform envisages national minimum standards covering recruitment, vetting, training, discipline, use of force and professional conduct.

The Federal Government’s Presidential Working Group on the National Policing Bill, established to develop the implementation framework, has also identified recruitment, training, equipment, custody, complaints, discipline, firearms control and independent oversight as essential requirements.

In an August 4, 2026 announcement, the State House said states seeking to establish police services would be expected to demonstrate credible arrangements for recruitment, vetting, training, remuneration, pensions, equipment and financial sustainability.

The proposed national framework is intended to ensure that decentralisation does not result in different standards of policing across the federation.

Nevertheless, independent monitoring will be necessary to determine whether states actually comply with these requirements.

Nigeria’s policing history provides another reason why the establishment of state police requires careful safeguards.

The #EndSARS protests of October 2020 exposed widespread public concerns about police brutality, arbitrary arrests, extortion, torture and extrajudicial killings.

The demonstrations also highlighted the difficulties citizens face when seeking justice against officers accused of abusing their authority.

Creating additional police formations without addressing these longstanding accountability problems could reproduce existing failures at state level.

The proposed reform must therefore guarantee accessible complaint mechanisms, independent investigations, transparent disciplinary procedures and judicial oversight.

Citizens should be able to report abuses without fear of intimidation or retaliation, regardless of the political influence of the officers or officials involved.

State police commissioners and senior officers should also be required to account for their operational decisions, particularly during elections, political demonstrations and communal conflicts.

The National Human Rights Commission and other independent institutions will have important roles to play in monitoring compliance with fundamental rights.

Furthermore, police officers must be trained to respect the constitutional rights to freedom of expression, peaceful assembly and association.

Without these protections, state policing could weaken democratic freedoms rather than strengthen public security.

Beyond the question of recruitment and funding, the proposed system must establish clear boundaries between federal and state police responsibilities.

Criminal activities do not always respect state boundaries. Kidnapping networks, arms trafficking, organised crime, terrorism and cybercrime frequently involve operations across multiple jurisdictions.

Effective coordination will therefore be necessary to prevent jurisdictional disputes, intelligence gaps and competition between federal and state police formations.

The National Police Council is expected to play a major role in setting standards and coordinating the two levels of policing.

The framework must also establish clear procedures for federal intervention where a state police service becomes incapable of maintaining public order or is implicated in serious violations of fundamental rights.

Such intervention must be guided by clearly defined legal procedures, independent scrutiny and safeguards against political misuse.

The National Institute for Security Studies and other policy researchers have similarly emphasised that decentralised policing will require clear jurisdictional boundaries, sustainable financing, independent oversight and effective intelligence sharing.

The approval of the proposed amendment by 28 state assemblies represents a major development in Nigeria’s long-running debate over police decentralisation.

However, constitutional approval alone will not resolve the country’s security problems.

The real test will be whether state governments can establish police institutions that are adequately funded, professionally managed and independent enough to protect citizens even when their actions conflict with the interests of those in power.

For communities facing kidnapping, banditry and other security threats, the expectation is straightforward: a police force that responds quickly, investigates crimes professionally and protects lives without discrimination.

For citizens, particularly journalists, opposition politicians, protesters and vulnerable communities, another equally important expectation is that the police will not become an instrument of political intimidation.

Nigeria’s transition to state policing must therefore be measured not simply by the number of states that establish police formations, but by the quality of their institutions, their respect for human rights and their ability to deliver security without political interference.

The ultimate question is not whether governors should have more control over policing, but whether the proposed system will give ordinary Nigerians greater protection, equal treatment under the law and access to justice.

Without credible safeguards, decentralising policing could simply transfer existing problems from the federal level to 36 state governments.

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